

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

3.2

Ārtabhāga Brāhmaṇam

Verses 1-8 bring out the connection between BU 3.1 and 3.2.

मृत्योर्मुक्त्यतिमुक्ती द्वे पूर्वस्मिन्ब्राह्मणे गते ।
मृत्युरूपावधृतये परं ब्राह्मणमुच्यते ॥१॥

In the preceding Brāhmaṇa are discussed the two, viz. *mukti* and *atimukti* from *Mṛtyu* (and now) the subsequent Brāhmaṇa is introduced for ascertaining the nature of *Mṛtyu*. [1]

Yet read SP: *mṛtyor iti brahmakṣatrādiricchedaheṭoḥ rāgādisahitāt mithyājñānāt karma tasmāt ... kālāt ... mṛtyor muktiṁ vyākurvātā tvamarthaśuddhir vihitety arthaḥ*.

किंलक्षणेन ग्रस्तोऽयं मृत्युनेति प्रचोदिते ।
ग्रहातिग्रहरूपेण ग्रस्तोऽयमिति कथ्यते ॥२॥

As (the thinker of Upaniṣad) is incited by the question, "By what nature of *Mṛtyu* is this one¹ grasped, i.e. overpowered?",² it is told that this one is overpowered by (*Mṛtyu*) of the nature of *Graha* and *Atigraha* 'the organs and the objects acquired by them'.³ [2]

See the next verse. Also NKL states *mṛtyurūpaṁ* as *indriyaviṣayātmaka*. See note of the editor of NKL: *grahāḥ indriyāṇi, atigrahāḥ indriyaviṣayāḥ*.

¹This refers to *Hiraṇyagarbha* which a worldly sacrificer became by the worships earlier explained.

²Cf. verse 10 below.

³These are explained in verse 10 below.

अधिभूताधियज्ञादिपरिच्छेदफलात्मकः ।
मोहासङ्गास्पदो मृत्युर्ग्रहातिग्रहलक्षणः ॥३॥

Mrtyu is of the nature of Graha(s) and Atigraha(s), i.e. of the nature of the result(s) accruing from limitations (on the inner self) which pertain to the elements and the sacrifices etc.¹ and which is the abode of delusion and attachment. [3]

¹This refers to *kriyā* 'activity', *kāraka* 'instrument' and *phala* 'result' etc.

इतो मुक्तस्य रूपाणि त्वग्न्यादीनि पुराब्रवम् ।
उद्गीथब्राह्मणे पूर्वमश्वलब्राह्मणे तथा ॥४॥

I have already stated in the Udgītha Brāhmaṇa and also in the Aśvala Brāhmaṇa that Agni and others are the forms of one (who is) liberated from this (i.e. worldly life). [4]

Agni is identified with Āditya and the other deities, viz. those which superintend over different parts of the human body.

फलं च ज्ञानयुक्तानां कर्मणामेतदिष्यते ।
उत्पत्त्याद्यन्वयात्तस्मादनित्यं स्याद्घटादिवत् ॥५॥

And also this is desired as the result of the activities of those who are possessed of the knowledge (of the actions and what is associated with actions) (and) therefore, owing to their connection with origination etc.¹ the (result) would be perishable like a pot of clay etc. [5]

This indicates that *becoming* Sūtra is not liberation.

¹The word 'etc.' refers to five other *bhāvavikāras*.

अतो यथोक्तादेतस्मात्साध्यसाधनलक्षणात् ।
संसाराद्धन्धनान्मोक्षः कर्तव्यो ज्ञानहेतुतः ॥६॥

Therefore by (causing the rise of) knowledge (*jñāna* *hetu* *taḥ*) one should effect liberation from the worldly existence which comprises the ends and means¹ that are already stated, viz. the bondage. [6]

¹This refers to the ritual activity which is a means to bring about the result, viz. heaven etc., cf. *kriyā*, *kāraka* and *phala* noted above under verse 3 above.

ज्ञानकर्मफलं दिव्यं यदि नाम पुरोदितम् ।
ग्रहातिग्रहबन्धेन तथापि सितमेव तत् ॥७॥

Yes, even though the result of knowledge and action (combined together)¹ was earlier pointed out as divine, that is still bound² by the ties of Graha and Atigraha. [7]

¹This is becoming Sūtra.

²This is from the root *so* 'to bind' (not 'to cut').

वाङ्मनःप्राणरूपाणां त्र्यन्नात्मन्यपि संभवात् ।
ग्रहातिग्रहरूपाणां नातो मुक्तः प्रजापतिः ॥८॥

The forms of Graha and Atigraha do exist even in the one of the nature of three foods (viz. Hiraṇyagarbha or Sūtra) as the forms of Vāc, *manas* and Prāṇa and therefore Prajāpati is not (entirely) free (from them, i.e. liberated).¹ [8]

¹Read SP: *saviṣayāṇām teṣām prajāpatau sattvam evātaḥ-śabdārthaḥ*.

BU 3.2.1 is under reference.

वागादयो ग्रहा ज्ञाताश्चतुष्टुवं चाविवक्षितम् ।
अतिमोक्षातिदेशोक्तेस्तद्विशेषोऽथ भण्यते ॥९॥

The Grahas, viz. Vāc and others are already known and (yet) their being four (in number) is not (specifically) intended.¹ Now then is stated here the specific (points of) distinction among them in view of (or, on account of) the extension of (the notion of) *atimokṣa*. [9]

This has reference to earlier discussion of the four, *vāk*, *cakṣuṣ*, *ghrāṇa*, and *manas*

¹Read SP: ... *atimokṣā iti vāgādāv uktanyāyasya tvagādāv atideśād grahaikavad avivakṣitaṁ catuṣṭvam* ... (and further elaborate comment which is not imperatively necessary!)

BU 3.2.2-9 is under reference.

ग्रहा घ्राणादयो ज्ञेया गन्धाद्यास्तदतिग्रहाः ।
ग्रहैर्गन्धादयो ग्रस्ता ग्रहाश्चात्मा च गोचरैः ॥१०॥

By Grahas are to be understood *ghrāṇa* and others¹ (and) Atigrahas are smell and others (viz. their objects). Smell etc. are grasped by Grahas. Thus Grahas 'organs' and also the Ātman 'inner self' are grasped by the different objects. [10]

¹This refers to the different organs. *ghrāṇa* is for *prāṇa* in BU, this by context.

अपानेनाहतो गन्धो घ्राणस्यैति वशं यथा ।
चक्षुरादिग्रहास्तद्वत्प्राणादिसचिवैरिह ॥११॥

As the smell which is brought by exhaling (*apāna*) becomes grasped by the nose, so (also) the organs, viz. the eye etc. are similarly (become grasped) by those (objects) that are subordinate to nose etc. (*prāṇa*). [11]

The word *prāṇādisacivaiḥ* conveys that the Atigrahas, viz. *rūpa* etc. must be connected with the inner self who grasps them. Thus, there is the relation of being bound mutually.

गन्धादिविषया धीस्थाः कर्मसंबोधिता यतः ।
प्रयुञ्जते हि घ्राणादींस्ततस्ते स्युरतिग्रहाः ॥१२॥

Since objects, viz. smell and others, which are abiding in intellect are revealed (*sambodhita*) by actions (of the organs) and then indeed (*hi*) do they put the nose etc. to action, therefore the objects are called Atigraha(s). [12]

This verse implies the idea of the inner self. SP adds: *viṣayāṇām indriyaprarakatvam anubhavasiddham iti hisabdārthaḥ*.

BU 3.2.10 is under reference.

योऽयं मृत्युरिह प्रोक्तो मृत्युस्तस्यापि चापरः ।
अस्ति नास्तीति वा ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य यथातथम् ॥१३॥

(A question is asked to Yājñavalkya:) Tell me clearly, O Yājñavalkya, if there really is or is not another Mr̥tyu for that Mr̥tyu which you have described here (i.e. in BU 3.1). [13]

अस्ति चेदनवस्था स्यादनिर्मोक्षो न चेद्वेत् ।
इति प्रतिवचः कष्टं मत्वेनं पर्यपृच्छत ॥१४॥

If there is one, there would be *infinite regress*; if there is none, there would be the absence of liberation. This, (Ārtabhāga) asked, having thought to himself that an answer to his question was difficult. [14]

न कश्चिन्नियतो भावो मृत्युरित्युपदिश्यते ।
विनाशको यतो मृत्युर्विनाशयान्प्रति भण्यते ॥१५॥

There is not any definite *bhāva* 'positive entity' which is described as Mr̥tyu; since Mr̥tyu is called the destroyer of them which can be destroyed by it. [15]

This verse aims to set aside the popularly accepted notion of Mr̥tyu as Vaivasvata (Yama).

मृत्योरपि सतो मृत्युरस्त्येवेति मयोच्यते ।
न चानवस्थेहाप्नोति सर्वमृत्युत्वकारणात् ॥१६॥

(Indeed) I have said that there is certainly Mr̥tyu even while Mr̥tyu continues to exist and this does not involve any *infinite regress* for the reason that all (objects etc.) are subject to Mr̥tyu. [16]

This explains *asti tāvan mr̥tyor mr̥tyuh* in BU.

सर्वान्नभक्षणादग्निर्मृत्युस्तावदसावपि ।
अपामन्नं भवन्दृष्टो बह्वीनां तनुविग्रहः ॥१७॥

Since he eats all the foods, therefore is Agni Mr̥tyu of them. And even he is known to become the food for waters that are in plenty, himself being smaller in form. [17]

अग्निर्हिरण्यगर्भो वा ह्यापस्तत्कारणं मताः ।
कार्याणां मारणान्मृत्युः कारणं प्रथितं भुवि ॥१८॥

Agni or (even) Hiranyagarbha has waters as the origin¹ and it is well known in the world that the cause is the Mr̥tyu of its effects as it destroys them. [18]

¹Cf. *apa eva sasarjādau tāsu bījam avāsrjat ...* (Manusmṛti)

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं मृत्युरज्ञानरूपिणः ।
संसारहेतोर्मृत्योः स्यान्नापीहास्त्यनवस्थितिः ॥१९॥

The knowledge of the real nature of the inner self is Mr̥tyu for what has the form of ignorance, viz. what is the cause of transmigratory existence, and thus there is not (at all) any

infinite regress involved here (i.e. in respect of what is under discussion). [19]

This has the basic acceptance of the inner self as not having any cause for its existence. (It is *really avyākṛta*.)

निरुणद्धि यथा जन्म तत्राशमपि तत्तथा ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं नानवस्थाप्यतो भवेत् ॥२०॥

As the knowledge of the real nature of the inner self does not hinder the origin (of things etc.) and similarly (it does not cause) the destruction of them as well, so, there is no *infinite regress* in this way also. [20]

अन्येऽतो मृत्यवो गौणास्तैर्मृतौ स्यात्पुनर्जनिः ।
प्राक्तनान्यपि जन्मानि सम्यग्ज्ञानं तु हन्ति नः ॥२१॥

Mṛtyus other than this one are (really) secondary and (in that case) there is a birth for an individual after he is dead. As against this (*tu*), right knowledge¹ destroys all our births of the past as well.² [21]

¹That is, *ekātmajñāna*.

²This is used only for conveying the idea about the births of all the three periods of time.

यथोक्त एव व्याख्याने युक्तेयं स्यात्फलश्रुतिः ।
न तु निःशेषसंसारविध्वंसिन्यात्मबोधने ॥२२॥

And this statement about (the accruing of) the result¹ will be reasonable only if the explanation which is stated (is accepted),² but this is not so accepted in case one is informed about the proper nature of the Ātman which destroys the entire transmigratory existence. [22]

¹This refers to *apa punar mṛtyam jayati* in BU 3.2.10.

²This refers to the explanation of Mṛtyu and its cause.

Now BU 3.2.11 is under reference. In the case of the knower of the true nature of the Ātman, there is no movement upwards etc., after that person's (commonly known) death.

समस्तमृत्योस्तमसः सम्यगात्मावबोधनम् ।
मृत्युस्तत्फलविज्ञप्त्यै परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥२३॥

Informing an individual about the proper (nature of) the Ātman is Mṛtyu, for the darkness is (in fact) the Mṛtyu of all (the transmigratory beings). Now the subsequent portion (of this Upaniṣad) is introduced for informing an individual of the result of that.¹ [23]

This explains *yatrāyam puruṣo mriyate ...* in BU 3.2.11.

¹Namely, *ātmāvabodha*.

सम्यग्ज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यो यदायं म्रियते पुमान् ।
किमुत्क्रामन्त्यतः प्राणा उताहो नेति भण्यताम् ॥२४॥

(One asks:) 'When this person, who has properly known the true nature of the Ātman, dies,¹ do his *prāṇas* move upwards or not?'—may this be told. [24]

utkrānti gati 'upward movement' at the final end of the journey for a man of transmigratory world is already discussed earlier. Therefore, this Brāhmaṇa, it is pointed out, pertains to the life-breath of a person who has known the nature of that.

¹SP states that the time referred to is marked by the exhaustion of the *karman* which has already begun to produce its result.

उत्क्रान्तौ स्यादनिर्मोक्षो जन्मार्थं मरणं यतः ।
अमृतिश्चाप्यनुत्क्रान्तौ सत्सु प्राणेषु का मृतिः ॥२५॥

'If it is accepted that there is an upward movement of (*prāṇas*),

then there does follow the absence of liberation, (just) because Mṛtyu is always to precede the ensuing birth.¹ If again there is absence of any upward movements (of the *prāṇas*), there is then the absence of death; for while *prāṇas* do exist (in a body) how could there be death?' [25]

This explains the purpose of the questioner in the previous verse.

¹This refers to *Gītā* 2.27ab: *jātasya hi dhruvo mṛtyur dhruvaṃ janma mṛtasya ca*.

दुःशकोत्तरमित्येवं प्रश्नं मत्वान्वपृच्छत् ।
आर्तभागो मुनिर्विद्वान्स च नेति तमब्रवीत् ॥२६॥

Having thought that such a question as he has put is very difficult to answer, Ārtabhāga asked that, and the knower (of the knowledge of the Ātman), the sage on his part, answered him in the words 'No' [26]

अकर्त्रात्मपरिज्ञानाद्धवस्ताविद्यस्य सर्वतः ।
देहान्तरग्रहाभावात्प्राणोत्क्रान्तेरसंभवः ॥२७॥

'There is impossibility of any upward movement of *prāṇas* because there cannot be resorting to another body by an individual who has his ignorance destroyed in every way (*sarvataḥ*) by means of the full (*pari*) knowledge of the Ātman as the non-agent (of any actions). [27]

यदैव सम्यग्विज्ञानं जातमस्यागमोक्तितः ।
प्राणाः सहेतवः सर्वे तदैवास्ता निरन्वयाः ॥२८॥

Just at the very time when the proper knowledge about the Ātman has occurred to this person by (hearing of) the statement of the Veda, all of his *prāṇas*, together with their causes,¹ have been abandoned, leaving no trace of themselves behind.² [28]

This seems to state that *prāṇas* of the knower of the Ātman do not function with any purpose as in the case of ordinary persons.

¹These are desires and activities etc. (i.e. *vāsanās*).

²This refers to ignorance (*mūlakāraṇam avidyā*) which is the material (*upādāna*) cause of transmigration.

नान्वयं सहते प्रत्यङ्गं चापि व्यतिरेकताम् ।
कौटस्थैकत्वहेतुभ्यां प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवस्तुनः ॥२९॥

(Now) the inner self does not tolerate any continued connection (of itself with something else); nor does it tolerate the possibility of a relation to the absence of any others.¹ (This is so) because the thing, viz. the true nature of the inner self has for its cause immutability and singleness. [29]

This argument sets aside the notions of the Ātman being non-distinct from the discrete worldly objects etc. and also not having a character distinct from that of any other object(s).

¹Sureśvara uses *vyatirekatā*, while *vyatireka* is expected in contrast with *anvaya*.

ध्वस्तध्वान्तस्य विज्ञानादतो हेतुफलात्मनाम् ।
दृशौ स्यात्समवनयः सर्पादीनां यथा स्रजि ॥३०॥

Therefore, in the case of a person who has destroyed his ignorance by this knowledge (of the Ātman) there would be the merger (*samavanaya*) of what have the nature of causes and effects in the seer, as in the case of a serpent and others while there (really) exists a wreath (etc.).¹ [30]

This explains *atraiva samavanīyante* in BU 3.2.11.

¹This is one more instance of Sureśvara's loose phraseology—*sarpādi* would expect its counterpart *sragādi*.

न स्वकारणसंसर्गस्तस्य ज्ञानादपहनुतेः ।
निष्फलं च भवेज्ज्ञानं यदि कारणसंगतिः ॥३१॥

There is no contact (of the inner self of a person) with its own cause (i.e. ignorance), owing to (this person's) having acquired that knowledge (which is) the very concealment (i.e. removal, of ignorance); (and) if there remains any association (of it) with the cause, then his knowledge would become useless (lit. fruitless).¹ [31]

¹Read SP: *sati jñāne kāryāṇām kāraṇasaṁsargaśe cet tadvināpi tatsambhavāḥ jñānavaiyarthyam.*

उत्क्रामन्ति न चेत्प्राणा नायं तर्हि मृतो भवेत् ।
देहस्यैव मृतेनैवं जीवो न म्रियते सदा ॥३२॥

(One would ask:) 'If the *prāṇas* (of this person) do not move upwards, this one would not be considered as dead.' (The answer is:) 'This is so, only where there is the death of the body (and) never does the inner self die.' [32]

Sureśvara takes *prāṇas* 'sense-organs' as belonging to the body and therefore the upward movement does not belong to the inner self. The upward movement of *prāṇas* implied their merger into their causes, viz. elements etc. This is his primary position and he confirms it in the following verses. In other words, it is only the body that dies, i.e. becomes subject to decay.

जीवापेतमिति ह्युक्तेर्जन्मादेश्च निषेधतः ।
यत्संबन्धादचित्कोऽपि जीवतीत्यभिधीयते ॥३३॥
देहस्तस्य कथं मृत्युर्जीवस्येहोपपद्यते ।
यतोऽतो देहमरणं प्रात्यक्ष्यादुपपद्यते ॥३४॥

[That it is the body which dies, i.e. decays, is supported by *anubhava*, i.e. *pratyakṣa-darśana*.]

'(This is so) indeed¹ on the basis of (lit. because of the Śruti)

statement *jīvāpetam* ... 'what is devoid of Jīva ...'² and also there is rejection of the origination etc. (of Jīva)³ on account of the connection with which even a non-sentient thing is said to be living [33]

the body of that (moves) upwards etc. How can the death of the inner self be reasonable: For the death (viz. destruction) of the body alone stands to reason, it being directly perceived. [34]

¹Cf. BS 2.3.17 which explains the use of *hi* 'indeed'.

²CU 6.11.3 which refers to the self; here is meant the inner self which is identical with the self.

³*Kāthopaiṣad* 2.1.18; cp *Gītā* 2.20.

BU 3.2.12 is under reference. There follows in verses 35-40 an exposition of *kim enaṃ na jahātīti nāmeti*— i.e. the name, viz. description 'he is liberated' remains after a person leaves the worldly body.

प्राणा एव विलीयन्ते किं वान्यदपि कृत्स्नतः ।
प्रयोजकादि निःशेषं म्रियमाणाद्विपरिचतः ॥३५॥

(One asks:) 'In the case of a dying person, who knows (about the nature of the Ātman), is it only the *prāṇas* that merge (into their causes)? or, is there anything else (that so merges) in its entirety? or that which affects (the activities of the sense-organs) etc.,¹ without (leaving) any remainder?' [35]

¹*prayojaka* refers to desires which cause activity and *ādi* to the world of the objects of desires.

प्राणमात्रविनाशे स्याद्भूयो जन्म प्रयोजकात् ।
सप्रयोजकतन्नाशे मुक्तिरस्योपपद्यते ॥३६॥

(The answer is given:) '(If it is held) that there is death (i.e. merger) of only *prāṇas*, then there would certainly be a birth

(for the dying knower) again, since there has remained that which causes activity.¹ And if you accept that there is a destruction (of those *prāṇas*) together with those which cause activity in them, then there does reasonably follow liberation (of the dying knower).’ [36]

For the dying knower of the Brahman there is not any more any connection with the sense-organs and also their objects; this duality does not exist in him. It is this thought which underlies this verse.

¹This implies what we have mentioned in the note on the preceding verse.

किमेनं न जहातीति पृष्ठो नामेत्यथाब्रवीत् ।
न किञ्चिन्न जहातीति प्रसिद्धेरिदमुच्यते ॥३७॥

(Then the Siddhāntin when) asked: ‘What does not leave him (i.e. this dying knower)?’ answers, ‘(It is only) name.’ This is in the same way as it is a commonly accepted notion that a (dying) person does not leave anything—nothing is left (behind) him. [37]

This explains the commonly accepted notion which forms the basis of the preceding verse.

नाममात्रावशेषं तदित्युक्तौ गम्यते यतः ।
न किञ्चिदवशिष्टं स्यादिति यद्वत्तथेह तत् ॥३८॥

As it becomes known from (lit. in) the (popular) speech, viz. ‘That has remained only in name’, that there is nothing left (of a thing); so that is here (in the answer). [38]

This explains the commonly accepted notion (*prasiddhi*) mentioned in the preceding verse.

शब्दार्थश्चाकृतिर्यस्मान्नातो नाम विनश्यति ।

आनन्त्यं नित्यतैवास्य नाम्नो न व्यक्तभूरिता ॥३९॥

Since the meaning of a word is but a form (i.e. some manifest form)¹, therefore, name does not (ever) perish and this name has infiniteness and perenniality, though it does not assume many manifestations. [3

This verse explains *anantaṃ vai nāma*.

What remains is the name but not the differently named individuals; for instance, in the statements like 'Śuka obtained liberation', 'Vāmadeva obtained liberation' and such other statements about different individuals, those individuals have died, but their names which are used in worldly dealings ever continued to remain.

Read SP: *vyaktibhedasya prasiddhatvān na tadvaktavyam brahmavidhaḥ svadr̥ṣṭyā nāmāpi na śisyate pra(=loka)dr̥ṣyā tadavaśeṣoktiḥ ... ato nāmanityatvaṃ vyāvahārikam*.

¹Cf. the discussion in BU 1.4 on *nāmarūpābhyām vyākṛta*, as SP has pointed out: *ākṛteḥ śabdārthatvaṃ tṛtīye* (i.e. BU chapter 1) *vyutpāditam*.

There is now in brief the statement of the purport of BU 3.1.3.

मृत्योः प्रयोजकं यत्स्याद्ग्रहातिग्रहरूपिणः ।
तत्स्वरूपावधृतये प्रारब्धैषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥४०॥

Now in order to ascertain the notion of what causes Mṛtyu which is of the forms of Graha and Atigraha, the subsequent Śruti has begun. [40

This refers to *yatrāsyā puruṣasya mṛtasya*

Verses 41-44 state the view of Bhartṛprapañca about the meaning of kim enaṃ na jahāti (which is already explained in BU 3.2.12).

वैश्वानरवरादत्र केचिदाहुर्महाधियः ।

देहद्वयविमोकेऽपि नैव मुक्तः पुमानिति ॥४१॥

Some (persons) of great intellect¹ have, owing to the favour of Vaiśvānara (viz. Agni), said in this connection 'Even if there is separation from both the bodies,² the person³ is still not at all liberated'. [41]

The second line refers to Bhartṛprapañca's theory of two *samuccayas* in relation to liberation. This is mentioned in the next verse.

¹Sureśvara thus expresses his mock regard for Bhartṛprapañca.

²This refers to both the *sthūla* and the *sūkṣma* bodies.

³That is, the person with the inner self.

नाममात्रावशेषोऽसावन्तरालेऽवतिष्ठते ।

परात्मनः परिच्छिन्नोऽविद्ययोषरूपया ॥४२॥

That (person) remains just midway between (the state of liberation and the existence on the earth), having only the name as his remainder, kept apart (lit. cut away) from the highest Ātman (as he is) by ignorance¹ which has the nature (similar to that) of a barren land. [42]

¹Read NKL: *brahmāprāpya saṃsārāc ca muktaḥ antarāle avidyāmātravyavadhānas tiṣṭhati*.

उच्छिन्नकामकर्मासौ कृत्स्नतत्फलभोगतः ।

उच्छिन्नाशेषबुद्ध्यादिस्तत्कारणपरिक्षयात् ॥४३॥

That person has his desires and (ritual) activity cut away by the enjoyments of all the fruits (i.e. results) of the same. And also he has his entire notion of them destroyed by the destruction (lit. decrease) of their cause. [43]

The second line points to how the *antarāle* 'vasthāna' (mentioned in the preceding verse) finally comes to an end.

अद्वैतदर्शनेनास्य द्वैतदृष्ट्यपनुत्तये ।
पर आरभ्यते ग्रन्थो ब्रह्मविद्यावबुद्धये ॥४४॥

Now, the subsequent portion of this Adhyāya is begun in order that the seeing of duality on the part (of that person) is removed by the sight of non-duality and that there is the acquisition of the lore of the Brahman by him. [44]

Verses 45-121 give blame to the view of Bhartṛprapañca in its various aspects (these are shown as subsections below).

अत्र यत्प्रतिवक्तव्यं तदुक्तमसकृत्पुरा ।
जिहेम्यत्र पुनर्वक्तुं पुनरुक्तगिरा भृशम् ॥४५॥

Whatever is to be stated as the refutation in this respect has been already stated by me time and again (lit. not once); therefore, I feel embarrassed to repeat what is said as the restatement of the same at length (*bhr̥śam*). [45]

~This refers to BUBV 1.4.1692ff. in relation to BU 1.4.15.

भाष्योपात्तमतो ब्रमो नानुपात्तं कथं चन ।
पिष्टपेषणवत्सर्वं पूर्वपक्षौक्तिदूषणम् ॥४६॥

Therefore, I shall state (only) that which is gathered from the comments in the Bhāṣya and not at all (*katham cana*) what is not stated by him, since pointing out the entire (mass of) faults in his view (lit. *prima facie* view) is like grinding what is already ground. [46]

The word *bhāṣyopātta* has to be understood in relation to the writing of Bhartṛprapañca and not to Śaṅkara's writing. Again the word *anupātta* stresses how various shades of thought which arise from Bhartṛprapañca's comment (without his own knowing!) are in this place avoided—Sureśvara has not done so earlier.

Read SP (followed by NKL): *bhāṣyoktaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ katham
api na brūmaḥ, kiṃ tu tenānuktaṃ bhartṛprapañcabhāṣyoktaṃ
taiḥ svadoṣatvenājñātaṃ taddūṣaṇaṃ apūrvam varṇayāmaḥ.*

द्वैतदृष्टयैव निःशेषद्वैतकार्यपरिक्षयात् ।
न भूतमात्रोपादाने बीजमस्ति मनागपि ॥४७॥

Owing to (the dead person's) seeing of duality (in its proper perspective), there is the destruction of the entire (world of) effects of duality, therefore, there is not even a little of a seed of taking up the elements (for the body by the Ātman of the departed). [47]

This verse originates in Bhartṛprapañca's own statement: *dvaitadarśanena kṛtsnadvaitakāryam ucchinnaṃ na bhūtamātro-
pādāne bījam.*

पुमर्थावसितेः शास्त्रं कृतार्थं विनिवर्तते ।
अद्वैतदर्शनेनातो नास्ति किञ्चित्प्रयोजनम् ॥४८॥

Since there has already occurred the accomplishment of the end of human life, scriptures become (only) redundant (lit. return); for their purpose is (already) achieved. And, consequently, on the acquisition (lit. vision) of non-duality, the scriptures have no purpose to achieve. [48]

This means Bhartṛprapañca's theory of the first *samuccaya* of *dvaitabuddhi* and *karmajñāna* effects the removal of the transmigratory existence. And, therefore, there cannot be any purpose for the scriptures to achieve. This is to say that the man is already *apavṛkta* '(rendered) devoid of (any purpose)' and therefore *kṛtārtha*.

अद्वैतदर्शनार्थाय शास्त्रारम्भोऽत एव च ।
नैवोपपद्यते कृत्स्नपुरुषार्थावसानतः ॥४९॥

For this very reason, the effort (*ārambha*) of the scriptures for leading a person to the sight of non-duality does not become reasonable, for all the ends of human life have been achieved.¹ [49]

¹In the view of Bhartṛprapañca, add here *dvaitadarśanenaiva*.

उपपन्नस्तदारम्भो मिथःकार्यपृथक्त्वतः ।
द्वैताद्वैतात्मसंदृष्टयोर्दन्तोलूखलयोरिव ॥५०॥

Therefore, there rationally follows that (viz. the effort of scriptures) is useful in that the seeing of duality and also of non-duality could together have their effectiveness, each being useful for (its distinct) different purposes; (this) would be like (the effects produced by) the (upper and lower) teeth of a person and a mortar and a pestle. [50]

The use of the teeth of a man is for chewing the food and that of a mortar and a pestle is to pound the grains so that their powder becomes eatable. Different parts of the Śāstra give rise to the awareness of duality (related to ritual) and non-duality (of the Ātman); thus, these two are different in their purposes.

आसङ्गकार्यमुच्छिन्नं द्वैतदृष्ट्यात्मनो यतः ।
आसङ्ग एव भूतानामुपादानमिहेष्यते ॥५१॥

As¹ it is held by the view of duality (between the Ātman and the varied worldly objects) that the effects² of attachment become destroyed, so here (i.e. in our view also) it is accepted that attachment itself (*eva*) is the material cause of the elements.³ [51]

¹This is for *tataḥ* which literally means 'because'. However, the intention is to point out the similarity between the *dvaitādvaita* view of Bhartṛprapañca and the Advaita view.

²The singular form *kāryam* is indicative of the plural *kāryāṇi*,

i.e. *jātāv ekavacanam*.

³In the Advaita view also, attachment to worldly objects is considered to be the material cause of *bhūtādisṛṣṭi* 'the world of objects which originate from elements'. But, of course, it should not be forgotten that *āsaṅga* 'attachment' is earlier stated to be *pāpman* 'evil, or root of evil, i.e. transmigratory world'. Cf. BUB 1.3.1 (p.44): *ko 'sau svābhāvikaḥ pāpmāsaṅgo mṛtyuḥ* and, in particular, BU 1.3.10 and 11.

स एष द्वैतदृष्ट्यात्र कर्मपक्षो निराकृतः ।
कामश्च वासनाः सर्वा माहारजनपूर्विकाः ॥५२॥

This is thus the refutation (or discarding) of the view regarding (ritual) activity in the light of the view of duality; and (it is shown that) desire is (but) impressions which have (been expressed) as preceded by (the word) *māhārajana* 'turmeric'.

[52]

This explains the thought of verse 51 in its fullness.

सर्वं चेद्विनिवृत्तं स्यात्किमन्यदवशिष्यते ।
तत्परिच्छेदि विज्ञानमविद्यैवावशिष्यते ॥५३॥

(Further, a question is asked by the Advaitin:) 'If (in your theory) all (the world of objects) has become destroyed (lit. turned back), what else does there remain then?' (The answer to the question can be:) 'There (yet) remains ignorance which is otherwise called *vijñāna*, 'the knowledge on the part of the inner self' which delimits it (lit. cuts it away from its natural status).' ¹

[53]

This verse is supported by SP with a quotation: *yathāhuḥ vijñānātmanah kim avaśiṣyata iti, vijñānātmanah avaśiṣyata iti bhāṣyeṇottaram āha*. This is further explained in verse 54 below.

¹NKL states: *tatparicchedakāraṇam ajñānam ity arthaḥ*.

कर्मारम्भे विकर्त्रेव स्वाश्रयस्य सदेष्ट्यते ।
इयत्ता कारकावस्था परिच्छिज्ज्ञानमेव तु ॥५४॥

It is ever accepted that, at the beginning, an activity is the specific modifier of its own substratum (and), being possessed of a certain magnitude, the characteristic of the state (of the inner self) as an agent of the activity it is only the specific knowledge¹ of the inner self which cuts it away (from the Ātman). [54]

Bhartr̥prapañca hereby reaffirms the effect of ritual activity only insofar as the state of duality is accepted and ignorance still continues to be there until the real state of non-duality is established.

¹We have specific knowledge in the light of what Bhartr̥prapañca has in mind, as explained in the next verse.

सैषाविद्या परिच्छेत्री ययायं परमात्मनः ।
संसारित्वं परिच्छिन्नो विज्ञानात्मत्वमश्नुते ॥५५॥

This¹ is that ignorance which cuts (the inner self) away from the highest Ātman, and by which there results transmigratory existence for the highest Ātman; (this highest Ātman, thus) delimited (lit. cut off) from its natural state, comes to have the nature of Vijñānātman. [55]

This explains the nature of Vijñānātman mentioned in the preceding verse.

¹This refers to knowledge mentioned in verse 54 above.

निवृत्तो द्वैतविषयाद्यप्येष तथापि तु ।
संसारावस्थ एवायं द्वैतत्वाद्ब्रह्मभेदतः ॥५६॥

Even if this one has turned away (from the status of) duality,¹ it still is in the state of a transmigratory being, on account of its difference from the Brahman and also its being subject

to duality.

[56]

Both AnSS and NKL misread *-viṣayādyadyapyeṣa*.

¹NKL points out *prathamopāstisāmarthyāt* which is paraphrased by the editor as *dvaitopāśanabalāt*.

यतोऽनवसितं वाक्यं पुमर्थानवसानतः ।
प्रवर्तते पुरेवातो ब्रह्मण्यप्ययसिद्धये ॥५७॥

Since the intended sense (lit. the sentence of Bhartṛprapañca) is not complete (in the light of above explanation),¹ the final end of the human beings (*mokṣa*) has not been accomplished; therefore, that inner self proceeds (to perform activities), as before, in order that the merger into the Brahman is (finally) accomplished.

[57]

¹That is, is not meaningful (*anavasitārtha*).

एकवाक्यत्वमेतस्माद्द्वैताद्वैतार्थवाक्ययोः ।
मोहादवस्तेर्न चाशेषः पुरुषार्थः समाप्यते ॥५८॥

Thus, these two statements, which relate to duality and non-duality, form one unified sentence(-meaning) (and) there does not occur destruction of delusion and thus the complete achievement of (the final) human end is not accomplished.

[58]

परिच्छेदं हि यत्कार्यं तदेव विनिवर्तते ।
ध्वान्तोच्छ्रितौ विकर्तृत्वं कर्मणस्त्वनुवर्तते ॥५९॥
आसङ्गश्च तथैवास्ते ते एते सङ्गकर्मणी ।
अनिवृत्ते सती भूयोऽविद्यां जनयितुं क्षमे ॥६०॥
अविनिर्भागवृत्तित्वात्सर्वदैव परस्परम् ।
न चाविशुद्धे द्वैतार्थे शक्यमद्वैतमीक्षितुम् ॥६१॥

It is only that which ceases to exist (lit. turns back) whose effect is delimiting (the inner self); but, when darkness¹ is

destroyed, there still continues to be the character of activity, viz. that it modifies (or affects the nature of the inner self).

[59]

And, attachment to the objects still continues to be there just the same. Thus, these two (viz. attachment and activity) being continuous (lit. not having turned away) are capable of generating ignorance.

[60]

Thus, since (attachment and activity) have at all times not existed mutually apart, and, the state of duality is not purified, it is impossible to experience (lit. see) non-duality.

[61]

¹This relates to 'whose effect' as already stated.

इत्यादि पूर्वपक्षोक्तिदूषणेष्वभिधास्यते ।
ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वसंत्रासात्रैह कृत्स्नोऽभिधीयते ॥६२॥

This and such other (argument) will be pointed out among the faults in the statements of the *prima facie* view; yet, for fear of prolixity of the work, I do not state the whole of it.

[62]

We should remember here that the *prima facie* view holds singleness of the Ātman consisting in *samasta* and *vyasta* forms (viz. in 'collectivity and individuality'). Sureśvara makes only the faulty statement of Bhartṛprapañca as the objects of refutation, as said in verse 46 above and as will be clear from the verses that follow.

In verses 63-83, there is refutation of the view: The first combination of knowledge and activity results in removal of duality.

भूरि दूषणमत्रोक्तं श्रुत्या च स्वयमेव च ।
पुरुषो वा इति ह्युक्त्या तथास्मादिति वाक्यतः ॥६३॥

In this respect, many faults have been pointed out by the

Śruti and he himself (has said faultily).¹ (This is clear) indeed by the statement (of the Śruti) *puruṣo vā* ...² and similarly from the statement *asmāt* ...³ (by Bhartṛprapañca himself).

[63]

¹This means that these faults in his own comments are to be gathered from his own interpretations of the Śruti.

²This refers to BU 1.5.2 and on this Bhartṛprapañca in BUBV 1.5.27-58.

³This refers to BU 1.4.15 and on this Bhartṛprapañca in BUBV 1.4.1644-1658.

कारणादक्षरादन्नं पुरुषेणेह कर्मणा ।
अव्याकृतादिभावेन व्रीह्यादित्वाय जन्यते ॥६४॥

In this view,¹ the Puruṣa who has not become manifest etc.² creates from the imperishable cause (i.e. the Brahman) the grains of rice etc.³

[64]

¹This is mentioned by SP in the sense of 'in this world which is the substratum of various enjoyments'. This could not be set aside altogether.

²The word 'etc.' refers to things like Vāc, body and intellect; see verse 66 below.

³This refers to other kinds of grains like barley.

तत्रैवं सति यद्येतदद्येतैव हि केवलम् ।
न जन्यतेऽतः क्षीयेत न त्वेतन्नेह जन्यते ॥६५॥

This being so, if this (*vṛihi* etc.) is not created by only the eater, then, therefore, it could not either decrease or be reproduced.

[65]

This verse answers the question that the food being continuously eaten could not be eternal. The answer means: as the food is being eaten continuously, therefore it is imperishable.

Read SP: *bhogasya sargāvinābhāvadyotīti hiśabdaḥ*. This is further explained in the next verse.

नित्यं भुङ्क्ते यथैवान्नमात्मा वाग्देहबुद्धिभिः ।
अक्षीणैः कर्मसंतानैस्तथैव जनयत्यपि ॥६६॥

As this Ātman ever keeps on eating (the food etc.) by means of his Vāc, body and intellect,¹ then, in the same way, by the continuous performances of actions which do not get exhausted (i.e. do not cease to be), he also creates the food etc. [66]

¹Vāc refers to Prāṇa, body to the sense-organs, and intellect to the internal organs.

भूतानि क्षीयमाणानि कर्मणा परमात्मनः ।
पुरुषेणेह जन्यन्ते तस्मात्स पुरुषोऽक्षितिः ॥६७॥

Since these foods (lit. elements), continuously decreasing, are created by the (manifest) Puruṣa, through his activity (or the activities of Sūtra), i.e. by the highest Ātman; therefore, that Puruṣa (is described as) not having any destruction. [67]

पूर्वकर्मोपभोगो यः पुरुषाणां शुभाशुभः ।
तस्मादासङ्गवैशेष्यादन्यस्य प्रक्रिया पुनः ॥६८॥

Whatever, auspicious or inauspicious, be the enjoyment by the Puruṣas of the *karmans*,¹ done earlier owing to the particular attachment of the Puruṣas to them, the latter (i.e. enjoyment) goes on being created (*prakriyā*) again and again. [68]

The underlying thought in the verse is: As the enjoyment of this life is the result of the formerly performed *karmans*, so there is the effect of the enjoyment for the mixed life through (or, as the result of) the activity. That is done in this life, thus, there will be continuity, i.e. absence of decrease, in the enjoyment or food.

¹This refers to *karman* done in earlier life (or lives).

तत्रैवं सति सासङ्गाः प्रायेण प्राणिनो यतः ।
अतः कामाशयवशात्सृज्यतेऽन्नं मुहुर्मुहुः ॥६९॥

This being so, since the beings are generally having attachment to the objects or enjoyments, therefore the food is again and again produced on account of the contents of the desires (of the present life). [69]

क्षीयन्तेऽन्याश्च भोगेन चीयन्तेऽन्याश्च कर्मणा ।
भूतमात्राः प्रदीपस्य संतानेनार्चिषो यथा ॥७०॥

(Thus) some elements and their *mātrās* decrease through their enjoyment (by the Puruṣas) and some others are created by (their) activities. This is in the same way as the continuity of a lamp which gives rise to (more) flames. [70]

परस्परात्तृभोज्यत्वसंस्कारोपनिबन्धनम् ।
विज्ञानात्मभिरारब्धं बभ्रमीत्यखिलं जगत् ॥७१॥

Thus, this entire world keeps on revolving as it is set in motion (lit. is begun) by the Vijñānātman, depending on various impressions such as being mutual eaters and having characteristic of what is to be enjoyed. [71]

विज्ञानात्मा हि यः कश्चित्कर्मणा येन केनचित् ।
साधिभूताधिदैवस्य जगतः सर्गकारणम् ॥७२॥

Whoever¹ be the Vijñānātman and whatever¹ be his activity, that is the cause of the creation of this world together with what is related to the elements and what to the gods. [72]

¹This indicates the process mentioned in the verse irrespective of the states of the Vijñānātman, whether high or low, and the nature of the activity, whether rigorous or mild.

श्रुत्यैतत्स्वयमेवोक्तं कर्म न क्षीयते यथा ।
दैववागादिसंपत्तिस्तथा त्र्यत्रात्मदर्शिनः ॥७३॥

This is stated by the Śruti itself, viz. activity never ceases to be; so also (never cease to be) the becoming of the divine wealth as well as that of Vāc etc. in the case of the one who knows (lit. sees, i.e. understands) the nature of the three foods. [73]

This has a reference to BU 1.5.2 and 18.

इदं तत्तदिदं चेति त्रिषु कालेषु नित्यताम् ।
प्राहास्य विद्यमानस्य विक्रियामात्रमेव तु ॥७४॥

In the statement *idam tat* and *tad idam*¹ the Śruti has declared the perennial nature of this existing world, in all three times; the world is merely the modification(s) indeed (*tu*). [74]

This verse expresses Bhartṛprapañca's idea about the non-origin and, therefore, the perennial nature of the world.

¹BU 1.4.7: *tad dhedam* ... which, according to NKL, is *sāmānādhikaranyāśruti*.

यद्यत्कामयते चास्मादविद्याकामकर्मणाम् ।
ब्रह्मण्यवस्थितस्यापि त्वक्षयत्वं श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥७५॥

The Śruti has stated *yad yad kāmayate cāsmāt* and thereby declared the non-destructible nature (of the world) which has been abiding in the Brahman. [75]

कृत्स्नप्राप्त्या क्षयो नातो विद्यते कामकर्मणोः ।
प्रमाणासंभवात्तस्मादसमीचीनमुच्यते ॥७६॥

Therefore, by obtaining fullness,¹ there is not destruction (or loss) of (both) the desire and activity. Since there is the authoritative means (to show that); therefore, what you have

said is not proper.²

[76]

¹*kṛtsna* here stands for Sūtra; this is to achieve the fullness of Sūtra.

²This argument of Bhartṛprapañca is against Kevalādvaitavāda. According to him, it is to refer to the statement that knowledge and activity destroy both the forms of human being and Sūtra.

व्यक्ततायाः क्षयो यस्तु कारणात्मतया श्रुतः ।
तादृक्क्षयः सुषुप्तेऽपि नैवास्माभिर्निवार्यते ॥७७॥

And what you have said as heard in the Śruti, viz. the destruction of the manifestation (of the object(s))¹ as having the nature of the cause and also a similar destruction (seen by us) in the sleep state,² is not denied by us.

[77]

Liberation is attained by the Kevala Advaita as complete removal of the notion of cause and effect. Bhartṛprapañca opposes only on the ground that since such removal of cause and effect relation is revealed in sleep therefore liberation should not be specifically mentioned as different from sleep. Therefore there is no end of effort to acquire the knowledge of Brahman without it.

¹Cf. *yat prayanty abhisamviśanti* (Taittirīyopaniṣad 3.1).

²Read SP: *svāpe 'pi siddhes tadartham samuccayānuṣṭhānam vyartham ity arthah.*

प्रत्यक्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानजन्मैव ध्वंसहेतुताम् ।
द्वैतस्यैति पुमर्थश्च नातोऽन्यत्किंचिदिष्यते ॥७८॥

And this statement of yours, viz. the very birth of the complete knowledge of the true nature of the inner self becomes the cause of the destruction of duality (and) there would not be desired any other end of human life.

[78]

This verse discards the authority of the Śruti in relation to

pursuit of the end of human life.

तमेतमिति च तथा सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ विनियोगः प्रदर्शितः ॥७९॥

In the Śruti statement *tam etam* there is clearly shown the employment (or usefulness) of all the activities in causing the rise of the knowledge of the inner self. [79]

Bhartṛprapañca asserts that activity done according to the Śruti injunction is helpful towards the rise of knowledge and thus the Karma- and Jñāna- Kāṇḍas are complementary together; cf. SP: *prāṇādīkānvayānurodheneti yāvat*.

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥८०॥

“The knot of the heart is loosened; all doubts are cut off; and all the activities of this person come to a stop¹; immediately as the highest one is known (lit. seen).”² [80]

This is a verse from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, viz. 2.2.9. Translation is reproduced from Hume's edition.

This refers to that the *karman* in this verse is taken by Bhartṛprapañca as an aid to knowledge. Hereby he justifies his theory of the combination of knowledge and activity.

¹Literally, they become destroyed.

²Literally, the one, who is the high and the low, is experienced.

भोगक्षयेण काम्यानां निषिद्धानां च कर्मणाम् ।
क्षय आरब्धकार्याणां ज्ञानिनोऽपि न बोधतः ॥८१॥

In the case of the knower (of the Brahman) also, the cessation (lit. destruction) of the activities, which he has begun in this life in relation to the rituals, both desired and prohibited, comes into effect only through enjoying, i.e. experiencing the

(same) results. But (this is) not so happening from only a person's knowing (about the nature of the Brahman) from Śruti. [81]

आभवादजितानां तु सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
क्षयोऽनारब्धकार्याणां सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रसूतितः ॥८२॥

There is cessation of all the activities (whose effects) a person has obtained from his very birth, but in the case of the activities which he has not begun (there is similar) removal revealed from the rise of proper knowledge (of the Ātman). [82]

ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ क्षये मानं कर्मणां विद्यते यथा ।
कृत्स्नप्राप्त्या क्षये मानं न तथा किञ्चिदिष्यते ॥८३॥

As there obtains in the rise of knowledge (about the nature of the Brahman) the means towards the destruction (lit. diminishing) of (ritual and other) activities, so do we not notice (lit. desire) any means towards the destruction (of the same) in securing (the nature of) fullness:¹ a means to their destruction. [83]

This verse answers a possible argument that obtaining oneness with Sūtra can, like the knowledge (about the nature of the Brahman), effect the destruction of the effects of activities.

¹This is becoming one with Sūtra.

Verses 84-89 discuss ignorance as the delimiting agent.

परिच्छेत्री न चाविद्या तमोरूपा हि सा यतः ।
आच्छादिकातः सा युक्ता समस्तव्यस्तरूपिणः ॥८४॥

(A possible objection of Bhartṛprapañca:) 'And ignorance also is not (i.e. cannot be) a delimiting adjunct (of the Ātman), since it is of the nature of darkness'. (Answer is given:) 'It is merely a cover and therefore (there is) the mention of

it (in the view of Bhartṛprapañca as of the Ātman having) the form of totality and individuality'. [84]

The argument of Bhartṛprapañca conveys that ignorance can affect the Brahman by obscuring all its forms.

न चापि मिथ्याविज्ञानं परिच्छेदकमिष्यते ।
परिच्छिनत्ति किं व्योम नीलज्ञानं मनागपि ॥८५॥

(But) ignorance is not false knowledge (which is) accepted (lit. desired) as a delimiting adjunct. Does (indeed) the knowledge (i.e. the viewing) of the blue¹ (really) cover the sky, even a little? [85]

¹This refers to false knowledge that the sky is blue.

सतो हि व्यञ्जकं मानं न तु तत्कुम्भकारवत् ।
मेयवस्त्वनुरोधित्वात्परिच्छेदकता धियः ॥८६॥

A means of knowing reveals only that which is existent, but it is not like a potter (a creator in relation to a pitcher). Knowledge (lit. intellect), (however) has the nature of a delimiting factor, since it follows¹ the object to be known.

[86]

This refers to the cause and effect relation between things if the cause has in it its effect in a potential form. The simile given in the second half of the first line refers to instance of opposite nature; that is to say a potter does not have in him the effect, viz. pot, in a potential form. Only clay can be called the cause of a pot. Thus it refers to the nature of a delimiting factor where the means has a relation to the effect, that is: the nature of the cause is in agreement with that of the effect. This is noticed in intellect with the impression on it of the object to be known, for only then the object is grasped.

¹That is, it covers or (fully) grasps.

यथावस्त्वनुरोधित्वमज्ञानस्यापि चेन्मतम् ।
मुक्ते मेये सदा मुक्तिर्बन्धो वा स्याद्विपर्यये ॥८७॥

If it is held that ignorance also has the character of being in agreement with the thing (i.e. object to be known) as it is, then the object to be known, being (already) liberated, there would ever be the state of liberation, and, if otherwise, (there would ever be) bondage. [87]

This verse answers the possibility of holding ignorance also as being in agreement with the individual just like *dhī* 'intellect', viz. the inner self as said in previous verse. This is because there would be in that case, at all time, the state of liberation or bondage.

नात्मानात्मीयकार्यस्य स्यादुपादानकारणम् ।
अतादात्म्यान्न हि घटं जनयन्तीह तन्तवः ॥८८॥

The Ātman cannot be the material cause of the product of non-Ātman because of (their) not having one nature; indeed threads do not (i.e. cannot) produce a pitcher. [88]

This verse emphasises the necessity of *tādātmya* 'having one nature' of (what are a cause and the effect). This is clarified by an instance of threads and a pitcher, which do not have *tādātmya* between them.

परात्मनः स्वतोऽविद्या बहिष्ठे कामकर्मणी ।
आगते न त्वविद्याया भवतैवैतदुच्यते ॥८९॥

Ignorance on the part of the highest Ātman comes into existence, on its own but (i.e. and) the externally obtaining desire and its object have not come from (i.e. are not produced by/from ignorance—(and) this (i.e. latter) is what you yourself have said. [89]

Read SP: *kṣīter ūṣaravad avidyā parasmāt svato jāyate kāmakarmanī tu savāsane pūrvapūrvakāmādivaśād uttarottare pratīcy utpadyete nāvidyākṛte ity etad bhartṛprapañcair evocyate.*

Verses 90-101 refute the view that desire and activity related to it effect removal of ignorance.

न चाप्यविद्यामसतीं शक्नुतः कामकर्मणी ।
तदकारणतः कर्तुं मृत्स्नेभाश्वादिकं यथा ॥९०॥

Also, desire and its object are not capable (of producing) ignorance which did not exist before, because they are not the cause of its production, like softened clay which can produce an elephant, a horse etc. [90]

Verses 90-101 refute that desire and its object can produce ignorance which is already destroyed by knowledge.

न चात्यन्तासतो जन्म कुर्याल्लोकेऽपि कारणम् ।
नर्ते धरां सुवृष्ट्यापि पद्मिनीसंभवोऽम्बरात् ॥९१॥

Indeed, in the world, no cause can effect the rise of what is absolutely never-existent; there never can be the rise of a lotus-creeper, even if there are good rains coming from the sky unless there is the earth (for its basis of origin). [91]

ब्रह्मैव चेदविद्याया जन्मनः कारणं मतम् ।
तस्मिन्सति समुच्छित्तिरविद्यायाः कथं भवेत् ॥९२॥

(A question is asked:) If it is held that the Brahman itself is the cause (or, origin) of ignorance, how could there be the destruction of ignorance while that (viz. the Brahman) ever continues to exist? [92]

आत्यन्तिकी समुच्छित्तिः स्याच्चेन्मोहस्य कारणे ।

सत्येव नश्वरस्यास्य स्वतः किं साधनैर्वद ॥९३॥

If there would be absolute destruction of ignorance while the cause of this perishable ignorance has continued to exist, then what is necessity of the means of the destruction of this perishable one? Tell me. [93]

न चेत्ते शक्नुतोऽविद्यां रक्षितुं कामकर्मणी ।
विद्यमानां विनष्टां तु कर्तुं ते शक्नुतः कथम् ॥९४॥

If those, viz. desire and its object (which we have already stated), are not capable of protecting ignorance while it exists, how would they be able to achieve (lit. do) that, when it becomes destroyed? [94]

कामकर्मादिहानेऽपि यद्यविद्यावशिष्यते ।
नेतीति वचसो व्याख्या तथा सति विरुध्यते ॥९५॥

(An objection is raised:) If ignorance continues to exist even when desire and (its related) act are given up, then the explanation of the statement *neti neti* would be opposed. [95]

नेतीति प्रथमः शब्दो मूर्तामूर्तनिषेधकृत् ।
द्वितीयो नेति यः सोऽथ भावनाप्रतिषेधकृत् ॥९६॥

(The answer is:) The first word *neti* is for denying what has a form and what does not have a form, and the second (word) *neti* is for setting aside the *bhāvanā* 'impression' of it. [96]

This verse shows Sureśvara's opposition to the explanation of *neti neti* which is given by Bhartṛprapañca.

भावनादिविशेषेषु यच्छान्तेष्ववशिष्यते ।
निष्कलं तत्परं ब्रह्म नेति नेत्युपदिश्यते ॥९७॥

What continues to exist (lit. remains) even when particular

impressions are destroyed, is then taught (i.e. described) the spotless, the highest Brahman in the words *neti neti*. [97]

This is the meaning of the sentence *neti neti*; it opposes Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the sentence as given under Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmaṇa.

ज्ञातं ब्रह्म यथावच्च न चापागात्ततस्तमः ।
इत्येतदविरुद्धं स्यात्प्रसादाज्जातवेदसः ॥९८॥

That the Brahman is known as it is and that ignorance did not go away from it would not be a contradictory (statement of Bhartṛprapañca) (only) on account of the favour of Fire.

[98]

Here Sureśvara is mocking at Bhartṛprapañca, who, by having the favour of Fire, claims to have the right understanding about the nature of reality.

द्वैतार्थस्य विशुद्धिश्च कीदृश्यत्र विवक्षिता ।
अद्वैतानभिसंबन्धो नाशो वा मलशुद्धिवत् ॥९९॥

What kind of purification of the world consisting in duality is intendedd (by him)?, and also a non-relation to non-duality?, or even the destruction which can be compared with wiping away of dirt? [99]

¹This refers to the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca.

समस्तव्यस्तसंदृष्टौ नाद्वैताद्वैतता पृथक् ॥१००॥

In the view of totality in difference, there cannot be duality as existing apart from non-duality. [100]

तयोरैकात्म्यतो युक्ता नापि तन्नाश इष्यते ।
नष्टे द्वैतेऽखिले न स्यात्समस्तव्यस्तदर्शनम् ॥१०१॥

Owing to their having a unified nature, the destruction of them also cannot be postulated. When duality is destroyed in its entirety, there would not be any experience (lit. seeing) of totality and duality. [101]

Verses 102-107 refute the postulation of the theory of totality and individuality in relation to reality.

शीतोष्णयोरिव कथं परस्परविरोधिनाः ।
एकत्र समवायः स्यात्समस्तव्यस्तधर्मयोः ॥१०२॥

How can there be an invariable association, in one place, of the properties belonging to totality and individuality, which are mutually opposed in qualities like hot and cold? [102]

अपूर्वादिषु जीवत्सु श्रुतिवाक्येषु शक्यते ।
नेश्वरेणापि निर्वक्तुं समस्तव्यस्ततात्मनः ॥१०३॥

It is not possible for even the Lord to explain (as coming from) the Śruti sentences the totality and individuality with reference to the Ātman, while there are (postulated) *apūrva* etc. and living (transmigratory) beings! [103]

This is for specifying that the Śruti sentences are in stark opposition to the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

न च कुम्भादिवदृष्टिरात्मनोऽव्यतिरेकतः ।
अनात्मत्वप्रसक्तिः स्याद्द्रष्टृदृश्यप्रभेदतः ॥१०४॥

Also, there cannot be any seeing of the Ātman as of the pot etc. on account of its having no (association with) any differences; (again) there would be the contingency of holding its nature as that of some non-Ātman on account of (holding) distinction between the seer and (what is) seen. [104]

नो चेत्समस्तदृष्ट्यैव व्यस्तदृष्टिः समाप्यते ।
आत्मनीति श्रुतेर्वाक्यमप्रमाणं प्रसज्यते ॥१०५॥

If this is not so, then the seeing of individuals is already pervaded by the seeing of totality and (thereby) the Śruti statement *ātmani* ...¹ would be contingently unauthoritative.

[105]

This argument is based on the opposition to Bhartṛprapañca's view by CU and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*.

¹Cf. *ātmani vijñāte sarvam idaṁ vijñātam bhavati*.

येनाश्रतं श्रुतमिति कस्मिन्न्विति तथा वचः ।
इत्यादि सविरुद्धं स्यान्न चापीहापरा मितिः ॥१०६॥

Also, in that case, the statement(s) of the Śruti, viz. *yenāśrutam śrutam* ...,¹ *kasmin nu* ...² etc.³ would be quite opposed; and there is not any other knowledge possible in his view. [106]

¹CU 6.1.3.

²*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.3.

³The word 'etc.' points to *ekam evādvitīyam* (CU 6.2.1).

समस्तव्यस्तसंदृष्टौ न किञ्चिदपि दृश्यते ।
पूर्णाज्ञानैकहेतुत्वाद्रज्जुसर्पादिदृष्टिवत् ॥१०७॥

In the view of totality and individuality there is not seen any means to knowing it, (in respect of the Brahman) seeing so would be like one's seeing a serpent etc. in the place of a rope (etc.)¹ owing to (the Ātman) being a whole and (is yet seen variously) owing to just one cause, viz. ignorance.

[107]

¹Sureśvara's use of 'etc.' after a serpent entails this second 'etc.'. Use of such similes as are not fully expressed is usual in Sureśvara's verses.

Verses 108-115 discuss the futility of holding the view of totality and individuality in respect of the Brahman.

अणुप्रत्येकशः सर्वान्स गृह्णीयादयत्नतः ।
द्वैतभेदानिमान्सर्वानेकैकस्य न वेत्ति यः ॥१०८॥

(Holding that view) a person might be able to collect (i.e. get to know) each one of the numerous atoms, without much effort, even if he does not know each one of these so many different objects that comprise duality! [108]

सर्वेष्वपि च दृष्टेषु द्वैतभेदेषु केनचित् ।
आनन्त्यं ब्रह्मता चास्य दुर्घटा स्यात्तथा सति ॥१०९॥

Then, if (by any chance) somebody has seen all the different objects of duality, there will be infiniteness of them and in that case, getting to know the Brahman would be extremely difficult. [109]

This emphasises the impossibility of knowing all the different objects which are held to comprise the Brahman.

द्रव्यदृष्ट्या समीक्ष्यन्ते धर्मा नीलादयो यथा ।
आत्मदृष्ट्या तथेक्ष्यन्ते नानात्मानो विरोधतः ॥११०॥

As the properties blue etc. can be seen (i.e. known) on seeing (i.e. knowing) the substance (viz. a lotus), so cannot be seen the non-Ātmans on seeing the Ātman because of the opposition (between them¹). [110]

¹Namely, the non-Ātman and the Ātman. They do not have *tādātmya* as blue and a lotus have.

तथा चेहागमवचः पराञ्चीति विरुद्धताम् ।
आत्मानात्मार्थसंदृष्टयोः स्फुटं नः प्रत्यपीपदत् ॥१११॥

To that effect, here is a statement of the Śruti, viz. *parāñci khāni ...*¹ which clearly denies the opposite character of the experiences of the Ātman and the non-Ātman. [111]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 4.1.

आत्मा वा अर इत्युक्तौ नैवानात्मेक्षणे विधिः ।
अनूद्यैव यथाप्राप्तमात्मदृष्टिर्विधीयते ॥११२॥

In the statement *ātmā vā are ...*¹ there is not at all an injunction regarding seeing the non-Ātman (as the Ātman); but it is the seeing of the Ātman prescribed only after restating (the various non-objects that is only the Ātman in reality to be).² [112]

¹BU 2.4.5 (=4.5.6). Yet more more proper example is CU 6.7.1: *ya ātmā ... so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ*.

²Cf. BU 4.4.6.

यत्र यत्र विधिर्दृष्टस्तत्र तत्रात्मकर्मकः ।
कृत्स्नानात्मानुवादेन प्रत्यग्दृष्टिर्विधीयते ॥११३॥

And wherever is there noticed¹ such an injunction, it has been only with reference to the Ātman as the object of it. There is a specific laying down the seeing of the inner self by merely reaffirming non-Ātmans. [113]

¹Cf. CU 6.8.7: *aitadātmīyam idaṃ sarvaṃ*

साध्यसाधनसंबन्धविज्ञानं नान्यतः श्रुतेः ।
तदन्येषु पदार्थेषु प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतः ॥११४॥

The knowledge of the relation of what is to be accomplished and what is the means to accomplishing it is not obtained from elsewhere than in the Śruti (related to rituals)—and that is only in relation to objects other (than the Brahman); because

they can be perceived by the means such as direct perception.¹

[114]

¹That is to say: The nature of a sacrifice etc. can be known from other means.

सर्वमानातिवर्त्यात्मप्रतिपत्तौ ततः श्रुतिः ।
निमित्तत्वेन सन्मानं सुषुप्तोत्थापकौकितवत् ॥११५॥

From that (it follows that) the Śruti, being superior to all (other) means, is a good means¹ for getting to know the Ātman just like a statement which awakens a sleeping man.

[115]

¹Because it removes ignorance about the Ātman.

&verses 116-121 point out that the Mantra in the Śruti does not refer to the combination of knowledge and activity as a means to kaivalya.

मन्त्राम्नायोऽप्युपन्यस्तो यथेह न विरुध्यते ।
तथोदके प्रवक्ष्यामः सर्वं भद्रं ततोऽस्त्वदम् ॥११६॥
परापरत्वभेदेन द्वे विद्ये समुदीरिते ।
विद्याविद्ये इहोच्येते तमोवस्त्ववसानतः ॥११७॥

As to how a Mantra from the Śruti is so stated as not opposed to (the combination of knowledge and action), we shall say later; let (only) this much be therefore well-said: [116]

There are two lores stated in the Śruti in relation to their difference as one being higher and the other the lower, viz. there is a statement made about knowledge and ignorance for showing that they effect the end of ignorance. [117]

तपो विद्या च विप्रस्य निःश्रेयसकरं परम् ।
तपसा कल्मषं हन्ति विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥११८॥

(It is said) that penance and knowledge (of the Ātman) is for a Brāhmaṇa the best cause of the highest bliss; the Brāhmaṇa destroys (his) sin by penance and obtains the immortal Brahman by knowledge. [118]

This is a verse taken from *Manusmṛti* 12.104, with a slight variation: *kilbiṣaṃ* is used there instead of *kalmaṣaṃ*.

ध्वस्ताध्यात्मादिसंभेदः प्रत्यङ्मोहैकमात्रभाक् ।
द्रष्टव्य इत्यादिविधौ प्रवर्तेत जडः कथम् ॥११९॥

How would a dullard (i.e. non-intelligent person) proceed to follow the injunction '(The Ātman) should be seen ...,' (the one) who has destroyed (i.e. is not aware of) the (confusing) mix up (of matters) pertaining to the body and who entertains merely delusion in regard to the inner self? [119]

इत्यादि पूर्वमेवोक्तं दूषणं दूषितात्मनाम् ।
आत्मानमेवेत्यत्रैव न भूयोऽत्राभिधीयते ॥१२०॥

This and such other (arguments) are the blamish which is already mentioned in respect of those who have spoiled themselves (by holding wrong theories),¹ in relation to the passage *ātmanam eva* ...; therefore, that is not stated here again.² [120]

This refers to BU 1.4.8.

¹The word *dūṣitātman* means one who has obtained and entertained the wrong information about the Ātman.

²In respect of the fault in the theory of Bhartṛprapañca.

सुविस्पष्टार्थतो भाष्यं टीकां नैव व्यपेक्षते ।
तस्माद्भाष्याक्षरैरेव शेषोऽर्थोऽत्र प्रतीयताम् ॥१२१॥

The Bhāṣya (of my teacher) does not at all expect (any comment on it) because of its extremely clear meaning;

therefore, let the remainder of the matter in the Brāhmaṇa be known from the words (lit. letters) in the Bhāṣya themselves.

[121]

Verses 121 to (the end, viz.) 165 are exposition of BU 3.2.12. There is decision regarding the abode of a transmigratory being on death.

ग्रहातिग्रहरूपं तत्प्रयुक्तं केन बन्धनम् ।
प्रयोजकावधृतये याज्ञवल्क्येत्युवाच ह ॥१२२॥

(Uṣasta) then said, 'O Yājñavalkya, who caused (lit. employed) the bond which has the nature of the organs and their objects;¹ (this he asked) with a view to ascertaining what caused (that bond)'. [122]

After some other thoughts have been expounded, there is now discussion taken up of the BU text proper.

¹This refers to *graha-atigraha* in BU 3.1.

कर्माश्रयत्वतो लिङ्गादविद्वानिह गृह्यते ।
प्रकृताया विभक्तेश्च विभक्त्यन्तरसंश्रयात् ॥१२३॥

Here (i.e. in this context) is understood (a man) who does not know (about the Brahman), because of the characteristic (of him), viz. his being the performer (lit. substratum) of (ritual) activity, and also because the (grammatical) case (of a *puruṣa*), (already) under reference has changed into (lit. taken recourse to) another case. [123]

In BU 3.2.12, there was reference to a man who knows the Brahman (*vidvān*) in the words *yatrāyam puruṣaḥ* ... and in BU 3.2.13 also there is reference to a man in the words *yatrāsyā puruṣasya*. Therefore, on account of the proximity (*saṃnidhi*) of the two forms *ayam* (in the nominative) and *asya* (in the genitive), a doubt arises if there is here in Bu 3.2.13 a knower

of the Brahman under reference. The verse discards the idea of a knower of the Brahman. The performance of ritual activity is a clear characteristic (*linga*) of a non-knower of the Brahman. This is a stronger reason for understanding the reference to a non-knower of the Brahman than the proximity already pointed out. Besides, the change of grammatical case—from the nominative to the genitive—can be an added reason. The reference by SP to *yad āgneya ...* and that by NKL to *sarvanāma-prasiddhamātrālambanam* may be further useful!

यत्रास्याविदुषः पुंसो मृतस्यायुष्परिक्षयात् ।
स्वयोनिं वाक्समप्येति वातं प्राणोऽनुगच्छति ॥१२४॥

When (*yatra*), i.e. after the loss of life in the case of the non-knowing man, his speech merges into its source and so also does *prāṇa* 'of principal wind' enter into the Wind, [124]

This refers to the merger of the organs into the elements which have been their sources.

अग्न्यादिदेवतांशा ये भोगार्थं कर्मणार्जिताः ।
वागादिशब्दैरुच्यन्ते त एवात्र न पौरुषाः ॥१२५॥

the words *vāc* etc. express those different parts (in relation to the deities) such as Agni etc. that have been won by the (ritual) activity (of a person) for the enjoyment (of the different things in life)—they are (intended here, and) not those parts which belong to a human body. [125]

This verse explains what are called in the preceding verse sources of different organs.

SP shows the relation of this verse to BU 1.5.15.

पुंसः कर्मक्षये स्वांशान्संहरन्ति यथायथम् ।
अग्न्यादिदेवताः सोऽयमुपसंहार उच्यते ॥१२६॥

The deities, Agni and others, withdraw their own respective portions (in a human body), when there is the complete cessation (lit. decrease) of a man's (ritual) actions—this is what is called *upasaṁhāra* 'withdrawing'. [126]

पुंसो देहग्रहे भूयो देहस्थानेषु देवताः ।
अंशं निदधति स्वं स्वं कर्मभोगप्रसिद्धये ॥१२७॥

These (very) deities, each of them, place their portions in various parts (lit. places) of the body of a man, when he again assumes a body in order that (the man) acquires the enjoyment of (i.e. the results of) his (earlier) activity.¹ [127]

¹The singular form is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

हृद्याकाश इहात्मेति स्यादाकाशाप्ययत्नतः ।
प्रश्नस्य विषयत्वेन विज्ञानात्मोपयोगतः ॥१२८॥

It is *ākāśa* in the heart which is (to be understood as) the Ātman, since even the Ātman¹ has a merger (in the sky); (it refers to) the mention of the knowing individual self as the subject-matter of the question.² [128]

This explains the meaning of the word *ātman* in *ākāśam ātmā*.

¹This does not refer to *mukhyātman*, which is said to merge into *bhūtākāśa*.

²Cf. the question *kvāyam*

अधिष्ठातृवियुक्तानि न्यस्तदात्रोपमानि हि ।
वागादिकरणानीति नालं पुंभोगसिद्धये ॥१२९॥

The various organs, viz. *vāc* etc., which are (then) separated from the superintending one (i.e. the inner self), are indeed similar to a weapon for digging, which is laid down (by a person) and are not capable of effecting (i.e. bringing about) the enjoyment of the human being. [129]

This justifies the propriety in the question with reference to even a subtle body (*liṅgadeha*) which, though accompanied by the individual self (*jīva*), is not possessed of the (gross) limbs that can secure for it the enjoyment of objects.

विदेहदेवतः क्वायं भवत्येष पुमानिति ।
आश्रयं क्वेति पुंसोऽसावप्राक्षीन्मुनिसत्तमम् ॥१३०॥

'Where is there this¹ man, who is now without a body and the deities (of the organs in it)? and where?—thus he (viz. Ārtabhāga) asked the great (*sattama*) sage about the support.²

[130]

This clarifies the question under comment.

¹*eṣa* explains *ayam* in the question.

²*āśrayam* (in accusative) refers to the object of the verb, in answer to *kva*.

किं कारणात्मतामेति किं वा केनचिदात्मना ।
अवतिष्ठत एवायं किं वा कर्मैव संश्रितः ॥१३१॥
गुणान्वा यदि वेशानं कालं वा दैवमेव वा ।
यदृच्छां संततिं शून्यं विनाशं वेति भण्यताम् ॥१३२॥

Is it that he (i.e. the departed man) becomes the Ātman which is the cause? or does this one find support in (i.e. the help of) some Ātman? or does he resort to (some) activity itself?

[131]

or some Guṇas? or some lord (or god)? or time? or Time? or chance? (or the world of deities?) or continuity (of knowledge)? or void? or destruction? Let (this) be told? [132]

Here Sureśvara refers to various theories about the support for a man's self after death. The first question refers to the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) about which there existed ignorance, the second to some Ātman which some fellow-Vedāntins

(*svayūthyas*) have posited as the cause of the transmigratory being (cf. CU 8.3.4: *eṣa samprasādo 'smāc charīrāt*) Then the questions arise respectively from the Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṃkhya, the Naiyāyikas, the Astrologers, the Mythologists, the Lokāyatas, the Yogācāras, the Mādhyamikas, and finally the Jīvakārya-tvavādins (viz. minor sect of Advaitavādins, SP calls them *svayūthya*).

प्रश्नेन भावितस्तुष्टः पाणिमस्याग्रहीदृषिः ।
अन्यासाधारणं प्रश्नमप्राक्षीदिति विस्मितः ॥१३३॥

The seer who was impressed and pleased by (his) question, took hold of his hand, surprised that he was (at the thought) 'This one has asked me some uncommon question.'¹ [133]

¹The singular is expressive of the many questions converging on one point.

असाधारण्यसिद्ध्यर्थमावामेवेत्यतोऽवदत् ।
विद्यागुप्तिश्च बहुशः श्रुतावपि समीक्ष्यते ॥१३४॥

Therefore, in order to make clear (lit. establish) the uncommonness (of the question), the seer said 'Let only two of us ...'. (This he did because), in the Śruti also, there is many times noticed secrecy (maintained) about the lore (taught, or talked about). [134]

SP and NKL refer to some passage from the Śruti, viz. Śātyāyana 33 and SP further cites *Manusmṛiti* 2.109 and 113-114. These are meant to support this verse.

आवयोरेव विज्ञानं यथेदं प्रागभूदितः ।
आवामेव तथैवोर्ध्वं वेदिष्यावो यथोदितम् ॥१३५॥

'Let this knowledge, which has been there herebefore, be known only for two of us; so shall we, only two of us make it known

to others hereafter, as said (below).

[135]

This verse explains the significance of *āvām* Yet read SP: *idaṃ vijñānam iti prayojakagocaram ucyate etasya prayojaka-vijñānasya yathoditam svarūpam ity arthaḥ*.

सजने प्रश्न एतस्मिन्ख्याप्यमाने त्वयोदिते ।
न सिध्येदावयोरुक्तं प्रयोजनमिदं ध्रुवम् ॥१३६॥

This question will not be decided, if it is being explained (while we are) among (the assembly of) the people. This is certainly the purpose in the statement 'Between only two of us ...'.

[136]

This brings out the purport of *na nāv etat sajane*.

न त्वन्योक्तिपरित्रासाद्याज्ञवल्क्योऽब्रवीदिदम् ।
जल्पे वाद्यतिरेकेण नान्यो वक्ति यतस्ततः ॥१३७॥

Indeed, Yājñavalkya did not say this for fear that somebody else might say (something about the matter) because, in any discussion (*jalpa*),¹ none else than the speaker (*vādin*) speaks.

[137]

¹*jalpa* is a kind of disputation (overbearing reply and disputed rejoinder). Cf. *ubhayapakṣasāadhanavatī vijigīṣukathā* (*Gautama-sūtravṛtti* 1.2.2). Read further SP: *vijigīṣus tatrādhikriyate yathā-huḥ, vijigīṣuṇā saha jalpavitanda iti. tathā ca tadīyaśaktinirṇaya-paryantaṃ nānyapravṛttir ity arthaḥ*.

परिशिष्टानपि प्रश्नानुत्क्रम्य व्याकरोदसौ ।
सजनादिति नातः स्यादन्योक्तिभयकारणम् ॥१३८॥

(Later), having gone beyond (the place of the assembly), he explained even the remaining questions, therefore, from the word 'from among (the assembly of) the people' there is not

to be understood any cause of fear.

[138]

Since Yājñavalkya made answers to other questions as well, it is not proper to suppose that he was afraid of the people around. The reason why he preferred to go away from it is already stated in the second line of the preceding verse.

साध्वेतदिति संभाव्य सजनादुत्सर्पतुः ।

याज्ञवल्क्यार्तभागौ तावुत्क्रम्य च जजल्पतुः ॥१३९॥

Having considered that this was the proper thing to do, both of them, viz. Yājñavalkya and Ārtabhāga, moved away from among (the assembly of) the people, and having gone to another place, spoke to each other.

[139]

This is the meaning of *tau ha*

सजनात्तावथोत्क्रम्य मिथस्तत्र यदुचतुः ।

तत्सर्वं श्रुतिराचख्यावस्मत्प्रियचिकीर्षया ॥१४०॥

All that, which the two talked between themselves after having gone to another place away from (the assembly of) the people, the Śruti has clarified with a desire to do what is good for (lit. dear to) us.

[140]

कर्मादिपरतन्त्रत्वात्स्वाश्रयो नायमिष्यते ।

संसारभूमिर्वर्तित्वान्न चात्मा कारणाश्रयः ॥१४१॥

This is not taken (lit. desired) to be (that man's) own support on account of his dependence on (his own earlier) activity, (but) because he is (still) in the world of transmigratory existence,¹ it is his inner self (viz. the Ātman) which is the cause, the support.

[141]

This verse has a reference to *kenacid ātmanā* ... mentioned in verse 131 above.

¹This points to the continuance of the enjoyer-enjoyed relation.

अचित्कत्वात्प्रधानादि पुंसो न स्थानमिष्यते ।
न कर्म तत्फलं वेत्ति न च कस्यैति संगतिम् ॥१४२॥

Pradhāna etc.,¹ being devoid of sentience, would not be accepted (lit. desired) to be the resort for the man; nor (also) does he resort to (any) activity, since he does not know the result of it,² nor also does he get united with Sūtra.³ [142]

This refers to the possible alternative supports of Guṇa, Kāla and Fate which are mentioned in verse 132 above.

¹This is to preclude the idea of an insentient support for the man. The mention of Pradhāna is owing to the mention of Guṇa.

²The man does not know if the (newly acquired) state was the result of any (particular) activity. The view of the Mīmāṃsakas is thus refuted.

³This refers to Ka as Hiranyagarbha, i.e. Prajāpati or Sūtra. There is not authoritative means to show that the man, becoming Sūtra, acquires (another/some) body.

न चेश्वरे स्थितिस्तस्य शास्त्रानारम्भसकिततः ।
कृतनाशकृतप्राप्ती प्राप्नुतो नुस्तथा सति ॥१४३॥

Not also (is possible) the man's stay with/in (i.e. in the form of some) lord/god since that would involve the contingency of non-following (the dictates of) the scriptures;¹ for, that being so, there would result for the man the loss of (the result of) what he has performed and acquisition (of a result of) what he has not done.² [143]

This refers to yet another alternative, viz. Īśana 'a Lord' mentioned in verse 132 above.

¹The man's stay with/in a lord (or god) would have already secured for him either heaven or liberation and thus there would

result the want of effectiveness (i.e. uselessness) of the activities to be performed according to the dictates of the scriptures.

²Also, the man would secure all enjoyment through the favour of the lord (or god) and that should mean his continued existence in the world of enjoyments! And that would invite the two well-known faults: *kṛtahāni* and *akṛtābhyāgama*.

दैवाधिष्ठित एवायं कर्मकालवशानुगः ।

प्रवर्ततां चेत्पुरुषो नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।

जडत्वादिति पूर्वोक्तो दोषोऽत्रापि च विद्यते ॥१४४॥

If (it is held that this) man would be active, being guided (lit. superintended over) by deities¹ or being under the sway of (previous) activity or time (or Time);² that also would not be reasonable; for in this (case) also, there would be the fault, viz. on account of (their) being insentient, as already stated.

[144]

This also has a reference to verse 132 above. Also by referring to the world of deities (*daiva*), Sureśvara's objectors who seek to avert the two faults mentioned in just the preceding verse require an answer—that also is given here.

¹This is not an effective alternative, since deities, though sentient, are themselves not independent—they depend on the aid of the organs and the insentience of these latter continues to become the basis of the fault. This has to be remembered, even if the other two faults, viz. *kṛtahāni* and *akṛtābhyāgama* are averted.

²'time or Time' also does not have independence. Yet, cf. SP: *agnyādidevatānāṃ caitanye 'pi svātantryābhāvāt tadyuktasya kālāder na bhoktrāśrayatvam ity arthaḥ*. Actually, this note suffers some confusion of understanding on our part.

सदेवताकं पूर्वोक्तं समर्थमिति चेन्मतम् ॥१४५॥

प्रवृत्तिरप्रवृत्तिर्वा देवतैश्वर्यतः सदा ।

नियमे हेत्वसद्भावाच्च स्यान्नैयमिकी स्थितिः ॥१४६॥

If it is held that the propounding (*samarthana* of) the earlier stated (view) that (the man's support) is having the deities (associated) with it, then (the question would be) 'Is there any activity or non-activity obtaining even owing the powers (*aiśvarya*) of the deities?' (It [145]
is so asked since) there is no reason for determining (*niyame*) the same (i.e. either of them), that (viz. one of them) will be (ever) obtaining as a rule (*naiyamikī sthitiḥ*). [146]

न चापि केवलं कर्म पुंसः स्यादाश्रयो यतः ।
अचेतनत्वानित्यत्वदोषदुष्टं पुरोदितम् ॥१४७॥

Nor also is (or, can be) mere activity the support for the man, since it is affected by the (two) faults, viz. insentience and transitoriness—as has been stated (by us) earlier.¹ [147]

¹Cf. the second line of verse 142 above.

मयायमनुयातव्यः कर्ता चायं ममाभवत् ।
कालादिविषयं ज्ञानं ध्वंसिनः कर्मणः कुतः ॥१४८॥

How (or, whence) can there be (on the part of that man) the knowledge of the flitting (*dhvaṁsin*) activity with regard to the time for (in that he would be required to hold:) 'This one (i.e. deity) is to be followed by me as he has been for me the agent (of the activity). [148]

This verse clarifies the thought (already) expressed in verse 142 above, viz. *na ca kasyaiti saṅgatiṁ*.

यत एवमतः सर्वे कालदैवेश्वरादयः ।
कर्मप्रधानाः पुंसः स्यादाश्रयोऽयमनुत्तमः ॥१४९॥

Since this is so, therefore all (of) Time, deities, Lord and others, who have (ritual) activity as (their) principal (guiding

force), would be the best support for that man. [149]

This implies that none of Time and others can be determined to be the impeller (*prayojaka*) of activity and therefore only *karman* has to be accepted as that.

हठो यदृच्छा नियतिः कारणत्वेन नाश्रिताः ।
संततौ चानवस्थानान्नाश्रयत्वं प्रमाणतः ॥१५०॥

Absolute (or necessary) force, chance, (and) fate¹ are not resorted to (by that man) as being the cause (of activity).² and, in respect of continuity,³ (it has to be said that) there is unsteadiness⁴ and there cannot be in that the nature of a resort (for him). [150]

¹SP and NKL point out that these words (each one of them) convey the meaning 'the nature of things (*svabhāva*)'.

²Namely, *prayojaka* or *pravartaka*.

³There is here reference to the Yogācāra view.

⁴*anavasthāna* means *kṣaṇikatva* 'momentariness'.

न कर्म पूर्वस्कन्धेषु नष्टत्वादुपपद्यते ।
न चेह परिणामः स्यादुत्तरस्कन्धसंगतौ ॥१५१॥

Activity cannot be reasonably held to obtain in (or, to belong to) the earlier existing *skandhas* 'aggregates (of elements)' which have already been destroyed (i.e. not existing any more); nor also could there be (understood their) full development (or, resulting into effects) noticeable for (i.e. as related to) the later *skandhas*. [151]

अनिष्ठितं न कर्मापि फलायालं भवेत् क्वचित् ।
न चैकत्रैकदा स्थानं विरोधाज्जन्मनाशयोः ॥१५२॥

Nor also activity, which has ceased to continue,¹ would anywhere yield a fruit (i.e. result) and there cannot be the

existence, at (just) one place and one point of time,² of the origin and the destruction (of activity) owing thier (mutual) opposition. [152]

¹This is based on *kṣaṇikatva* 'momentariness' of activity also.

²This is on account of the momentariness (i.e. the flitting character of activity).

न च स्कन्धातिरेकेण स्थिरः कश्चिदपीष्यते ।

भोगमोक्षाभिसंबन्धी यं प्रत्येतत्प्रवर्तते ॥१५३॥

Nor is any thing other than *skandha* accepted (by the holders of the theory of momentariness) as steady towards which this (viz. activity) and a person, intending to secure (lit. related to) enjoyments and/or liberation, proceeds (or strives). [153]

This is to refute the theories which hold that there are momentary *skandhas*.

अनारम्भश्च शून्येऽपि यथायमुपलभ्यते ।

मितेश्चासंभवाच्छून्यं सर्वथा नोपपद्यते ॥१५४॥

And since there is noticed this inaction (lit. non-beginning of activity)¹ and there is impossibility of (the existence of) knowledge (for more than a moment),² (the theory of) *śūnya* 'void'³ does not at all⁴ appear to be reasonable. [154]

¹This pertains to what is prescribed by scriptures.

²That momentariness of it cannot be proven by any means of knowing.

³That is *jīvanāśa* (SP).

⁴SP states: *pramāṇato yuktitaś ca*.

यत एवमतो न्याय्यं कर्मैवास्य समाश्रयः ।

संसारभूमौ पुंसः स्यात्कालादेस्तत्प्रधानतः ॥१५५॥

Since this is so, it is only reasonable to hold that the support of this man is only activity, right from the time that he has been on the level of transmigratory existence where activity is the principal thing. [155]

Here Sureśvara affirms his own view, after completing the refutation of others' views.

कर्मप्राधान्यमेवातः स्वयमेवाब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ।
कालदैवेश्वरादिभ्यः कालादेस्तत्प्रयुक्तितः ॥१५६॥

Therefore, the Śruti of itself declared the principal significance of activity since it is urged by Time, the deities, the lord from the beginning of time. [156]

सति कर्मणि वैचित्र्यं भूतानामुपपद्यते ।
कर्मशब्देन विद्या च भावना कर्म चोच्यते ॥१५७॥

There results variety of elements (only) when there is activity. The word activity expresses knowledge, meditation and activity.¹ [157]

¹This is the meaning of the word *karman* in *karma haiva tad ūcatuḥ*.

देहारम्भे न शुद्धस्य कर्मणः शक्तिरिष्यते ।
तस्मान्नितयमप्येतत्कर्मशब्देन भण्यते ॥१५८॥

In any act of the body, it is not accepted that (there is need of) capacity for activity alone. Therefore, this triad also is expressed by the word *karman*. [158]

This explains the purpose of the second line of the preceding verse.

एवं तौ संप्रधार्यैतदुक्तदोषानभिप्लुतम् ।

यियासोः परलोकाय कर्मैवाश्रयमूचतुः ॥१५९॥

Having thus decided together—this which is free from blemishes¹ that are mentioned—they declared that activity¹ alone is the support for one who is desirous of going to the yonder world. [159]

¹This refers to the *karman* mentioned in verse 157 above.

कारणानां यथोक्तानां यच्च तौ प्रशशंसतुः ।
कर्मैवोक्तेषु सर्वेषु प्रशशंसतुरादरात् ॥१६०॥

And among the various causes, which the two mentioned (as a support for such a man), only that which those two praised is just activity alone (as stated above). [160]

कारणत्वाविशेषेऽपि किं प्रधानमितीक्षणे ।
कर्मणः स्यात्प्रशंसैवं तत्प्राधान्योपपत्तितः ॥१६१॥

When one thinks about what is (of) principal (importance), when there is no specification made about what has the nature of the cause, there can be only a praise of action, since it is only reasonable to hold the prominence of it. [161]

वशीकृत्येश्वरादीनि कारणानि स्वतन्त्रवत् ।
कर्म सिध्यद्यतो दृष्टं प्रधानं कर्म तेन तत् ॥१६२॥

Since activity¹ is seen to succeed (in bringing about its effect(s), like an independent (cause), after bringing under its control the (other) causes, viz. the Lord and others; that activity¹ is the principal (among all causes). [162]

¹This also refers to 'activity' mentioned in verse 157.

क्रियां प्रत्यगुणीभूतं नेश्वराद्यपि सिध्यति ।
कर्मातस्तेषु सर्वेषु प्रधानमिति भण्यते ॥१६३॥

Īśvara 'Lord' etc., which has not become subservient to activity,¹ does not succeed (in being the support for that man), therefore, 'activity' among all of them is described as the principal among them all. [163]

¹The word *kriyā* stands for *karman*.

यस्मादेवमतः प्रेतो देवताविरहेऽपि ना ।
 देहादस्मात्परिभ्रष्टः कर्मप्राधान्यसंश्रयात् ॥१६४॥
 पुण्यः पुण्येन भवति पापः पापेन कर्मणा ।
 इति श्रौतं वचो ज्ञेयमागमैकप्रमाणतः ॥१६५॥

Since this is so, therefore, a man who has departed from this (world) and separated from this body, (superintending over his various organs) [164] becomes, owing to his principal support in activity, pious by pious activity and/or sinful by sinful activity, even in the absence of the deities; this statement from the Śruti has to be known from the lone authority of the Śruti. [165]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
 द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥२॥
